J
be sought in Europe. Can it be that her Majesty's Goveniment bavo advanced in that direction so far that the time has arrived when the announcement of a
Bil
change of policy had to be made by conspicuous mein- bor of the Cabinet ? I cannot conceive that such announcement would otherwise be made. And for this reason, that although it is no doubt extremely true that in these democratic times yon have to carry the country with you, yet, on the other hand, the country will expect that your foreign affairs will be con ducted in such a way as to be likely to be successful, and they will not pardon you if you are unsuccessful, merely by saying, Ob, it was necessary to tell you what we were thinking of,' (Hear, hear.) Now it appears to me that unless her Majesty's Government have given such indications to other Powers on this subject, and those indications have met with such a reception that they are justified in bringing this before
the country as a matter which it up Sexiously to con-
sider, because the time may not be distant when an actual alliance may be concluded-unless they have done that no possible step could be taken more likely to
pre- vent the conclusion of such an alliance than sach state- menta as those of Alr. Chamberlain. It is from that point of view I complain bitterly of
such
speech having been made. (Hear, hear.) It is not, I imagine, possible for any man who bas been connected in any way with the conduct of foreign affairs in this country! to shut his
eyes to the possible danger which may arise from uur isolation, nor can he keep out of mind that it might be possible-I am not saying for a moment it is desirable-for the
very safety of
this country to enter into an alliance, if it can be found, for matual defence with fother Great Powers: but the crisis of affairs when that should be seriously attempted, in my opinion, has not arrived. Little, indeed, an I see the day when it will arrive. With reference to another part of Mr. Chamberlain's speech-namely, an attack apou our commercial policy-I do not think there is the remotest chance of an allianos based upon cam- mercial policy with any nation. What might be possible is this--there may be cases where the interests of other nations coincide with curs, and if their interests and cars are the same in any great crisis it may be-- I do not say it is--possible for this nation to elliance for mutual defence.
come to auch
our
I will not believe, until I hear it, that the 5.0 Government intend to enter into an alliance of a mutual defence for the purpose of maintaining position in China, kuowing, as we do, that sach an Alliance could not be conducted on the principle of limited liability, but that mutual defence would mean matual defence in every part of the world. (Cheers.) I am most desirous, and I believe the, country is also, clearly to understand what is the basis of the policy of her Majesty's Government in
in the Far East. Wo wish to know that the Government have some clear view as to the policy which is to be porsced by them,
and unless there is something in it which is entirely coa trary to the safety of the country it will receive no obstruction from this side of the House. (Cheers,}
The MARQUIS of SALISBURY.-The notice of the noble lord was to ask what are the intentions of her Majesty's Government as to the occupation of Wei-hai- wei. It would have been difficult for me to foresee in that notice an intention on the part of the noble earl to enter upon a lengthened examination of and disserta- tion on Mr. Chamberlain's speech; and, indeed, I do not think he can have bad thus intection, for he put the notice down before the speech was delivered. (The Earl of Kimbering. Quite so.") But I do not feel that I ought to enter upon such ■ discussion witheat the advantage of notice, and especially without the initial advantage of having in my hand the speech of my right hon, friend. It is evident that the greater part of the argument of the latter portion of the noble earl's speech turned upon the interpretation to be placed upou various sentences uttered by Mr. Chamberlainat Birm- ingham, and I could not, without adequate opportunity of examining the accuracy of the noble lord's investiga- tious, undertako to discuss each a matter with him. I will only dwell upon oue matter which he referred to and which has been entered into by Mr. Chamberlain--- namely, the effect on the present state of affairs of the policy pursued by the late Government at the close of the Chias-Japanese war. I very much concur with the general principles which the noble lord laid down- namely, that it was not desirable that we should join in austing the victor from the result of the victory which ho bad won; and still more, that it was greatly contrary to our policy to do anything which would alienate the rising we had so
power of Japan, with whom many grounda of sympathy and co- operation. (Rear, bear.) I entirely conenr in that view, and if I were to venture on the policy of that time it would be from a totally a criticism of different aspect. I should have doubted the wisdom of this country standing by and seeing Russia and her allies driving Japan out of
the
without taking some security that Russia was not doing Leao-tong Peninsula that with a view to future
is that that might have been a condition to obtain at operations. My impression the time-that all parties who took a sbara in that arrangement should bind themselves to deprive Chiux in the future of the territory which they were then preserving. That is a security, which Japan
in would bare joined. That is the only point in the noble lord's criticism on Mr. Chamberlain a speech which I will venture to examine; because it is obvious that it 16 easy to draw the most general conclusions from isolated scatenees; and that without a careful study of the matter that comes before and after then it would be impos sible to
By whether those conclusions are just. I venture to confine my answer to the question of which the noble earl notice, and to speak merely with respect to Wei-hai-wei. I think the noble eari was somewhat hypercritical in his treatment of the metaphors which had been employed by myself and Mr. Chamberlain. If the noble earl quoted us rightly-and I do not for a mument doubt it-it does appear that on one occasion I spoke
of China in terms which would imply that sto was upright, and that on another occasion Mr. Chamberlain spoke of China in terms which might imply that she was prostrate, No doubt those terms are not on all fours with each other. (Laughter.)
Bare
But it does not follow that they cannot both with perfect justice and truth be applied to the HAMO subject from different points of view. As far as it was a question of resisting the Powers at the moment, undoubtedly Chiua was prostrate she had no power at her command to range against the forces which Russia could have brought against her. But if you take a wider view, and look into the future, and ask what are the powers of which, for future contingencies, China might dispose, I think you will conclude that, on a wide view of that kind, you never can pronounce that 400 millions of men who, whatever else they are, are the bravest of the brave, and fear death less than any race we know of, could ever be absolutely prostrate. (Hear, hear.) I do not believe for moment in the prostration of China in that wider sense. She has got & Goverment of whose
merits we cannot, perhaps, speak in enthusiastic terms; but still it is a Government which enables
an enormous commerce to be carried on. She raises a large revenue, and she has traditions of any centuries in the possession of an empire of
unequalled compactness and reagnitude. And she has this enormous population who are united at all events by this one sentiment that the thing which they hate most of all is the domination of the foreigner. Who shall say that these men are helpless ? Of that China for ever prostrate, because she
cannot
nnot give effect to the enor mous material and physical forces she possesses? I should say that what China wants is courage; and it has a tendency to streion of Wei-hai-wei is that of my defences of the
China against despair,
one
and to give her courage, if the occasion #hould arise, to stand up against her enemies. The danger of allowing the occupation of Port Arthur to take place without any corresponding movement on our side was that large classes of Chinamen would give themselves up to despair, and believe that the domination of one foreign Power was the destiny from which it was impossible for them to escape. It was our business to tell them that, as far as we were able to prevent it, that destiny would not overtake them. I do not know that we could have done anything better for restoring their courage, and I am quite sure that there was no more effective method of driving them to despair then allowing Port Arthur to be occupied by the Power which already stande orez so exormons portion of the frontier, and threatens them with so large
a conquest. I think the mistake of the molde earl's estimate of the policy in the East is that it is somewhat too material. He has naked whether, on strategic grounds, Wei-hai-wei mocid be or ench enormous value. do not care to answer him on thet point, not because I doubt it myself, but because it requires for its treatment an expert knowledge whieh I do not posSAZE. But what is really of importance is the effect which our policy should have upon the opinion of the East and remember, that in alluding to the opinion of the East" I do not merely speak of the opinion of those 460 millions of Chinemen, all-important: ae that may be. But I recognize the fact that there are other
anglent monarchies in the neighbourhood of China which appear now to be on an upward and pro- gressive course, and whose policy and power will weigh heavily in
in determining the destinies of the future. (Flear,
hear,) It was most important that not only in Chinesu opinion, but that in korean and Japanese opinion also, we should not be thought to be throwing up the game in the neighbourhood of those territories lying near l'ort Arthur. Therefore, as ob agent operating on the opinions of large masses of men, I think the
occupation of Wei-bai-wei was a
a wize occupation. The noble earl, I thought, rather inti- mated or binted that we had done it very likely tuerely to satisfy a passing political necessity. I entirely repudiate that idea, cannot understand on what it is based. Our position was simply this. did not wish to see begin in any degree the dismember ment of China. We did not wish to encourage it; and above all, we did not desire to be thought, by the Chinese and by the other nations to which I have referred, to be ourselves on the look-out for territorial seizures and to be willing to take part in the division of which other nations might be looking for.
We
Our obj was not only to discourage the dismemberment o of China, but to repudiate and throw oft from ourselves the im putation and opprobrium that we were seeking to begin it. For that reason
we could say nothing about cocupying any of the
northern perts as no other nation was known to latend doing so. 80 long I doubt very much whether, at all creats, as an early and immediate measure, the occupation of Port Arthur was resolved upon in the councils of Russia. But be that as it may, with our object of convincing nations in the East that we were not bent on territorial aggrandisement, it was necessary that wo should have practical, clear, and manifest evidence of her action and ber design to justify us in taking a similar measure and therefore it
it was that we said nothing about Wei-bai-wei until we felt certain that Port Arthur was about to be compied. What we are to with Wei-bai-wei 18 the next question of the noble earl. Well, I would remind the noble earl that Wei-hai-wei is at present in the occupation of Japan, and that we clearly can do nothing with Wei-hai-wei until Japan has surrendered it into our hands. What is more, though we can very easily lay down general principles as to our conduct in this respect,
anything Answer in detail to that question must be absolutely impossible until the place is obtained by us. That it will be our duty to garrison and protect it, so far se garrison and protection are necessary, is a truism in itself. That it is our object to improve the harbour and make it better for the purposes it will have to full is another truism. But until we have minate information, such information as I imagine is yet possessed by no nation, we cannot tell how far opera- tions for its improvement can be carried on with a certainty of sufficient success to justify the expense which would be incurred upon them. There are at present officers both of the Army and Navy on their way to Wei-hai-wei. We look to them for reports, which I have no doubt will be both detailed and very. valuable. We shall then be able to form, not only in general, but in minate particulars an idea of the precise extent to which 'expenditure will have to be incurred, and the precise manner in which that expendi ture will baro to be made. I do not know, however, that, even when we have that information, I couli promise to communicate it to the noble earl across the
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